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Abstract
The recent extensive package introduced by the Commission is the most comprehensive 
reinforcement of economic governance in the EU and the euro area since the launch 
of the Economic and Monetary Union. Broader and enhanced surveillance of ﬁ  scal 
policies, but also macroeconomic policies and structural reforms are sought in the 
light of the shortcomings of the existing legislation. New enforcement mechanisms are 
foreseen for non-compliant Member States. In this very crucial and important package 
of 6 legislative dossiers this paper tries to identify critical missing or redundant and/
or unworkable elements within the Commission package. Moreover, it checks what (if 
anything) is missing outside and beyond the proposals in order to make the whole 
package of governance reform complete and workable as, for instance, crisis resolution 
mechanisms and debt restructuring, EMF, project bonds and Eurobonds.
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1. Introduction 
The extensive package introduced by the Commission is the "most comprehensive 
reinforcement of economic governance in the EU and the euro area since the launch of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. Broader and enhanced surveillance of fiscal policies, but 
also macroeconomic policies and structural reforms is sought in the light of the 
shortcomings of the existing legislation. New enforcement mechanisms are foreseen for 
non-compliant Member States."  
In this very crucial and important package of 6 legislative dossiers this briefing paper tries 
to: 
- on the one hand, help to identify critical missing, or redundant/unworkable, elements 
within the Commission package, and,  
- on the other hand, check what (if anything) is missing outside and beyond the proposals 
in order to make the whole package of governance reform complete and workable (e.g. 
crisis resolution mechanisms and debt restructuring, EMF, project bonds, Eurobonds etc.). 
2. Clear change in perspective after European Council meeting 
The package deal following Deauville 
At the European Council meeting of 28-29 October, the heads of state came up with a quite 
striking package deal which was prepared a couple of days before at the bilateral French-
German summit in Deauville. It changed the context of the legislative proposals on EU 
economic governance of 29 September 2010 decisively: the result was an unanimous 
agreement to conduct a ‘limited’ Treaty reform, which in turn puts Germany in a position to 
agree to a permanent crisis resolution mechanism, i.e. a permanent successor to the 
temporary three-year European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 
Especially German politicians do not grow tired of announcing that the planned crisis 
resolution mechanism which will in the future call on private creditors for the financial 
recovery of ailing euro area member states will be implemented not earlier than 2013, the 
date by which any limited treaty changes can be ratified. But provisions are said to have 
been made in May 2010 against every possible development in the years until 2013. The 
responsibility of filing a petition to help rests upon each member state if a country should 
believe it is in need of this support. This briefing paper will later on argue that the notion of 
“every possible … ” is not generally applicable in this context because the billions of euros 
ascribed to the EFSF package are gross values which might be enough to cope with a 
default of Greece and Portugal, but certainly not if Spain would also be involved.  
France agreed to the proposal for a so-called permanent crisis resolution mechanism in 
exchange for Germany yielding to France's desire for more lenient rules for states that 
break the EU's debt and deficit limits (Belke, 2010b).  
“Just adding a few words” 
The agreement included a commitment not to change the so-called no bail-out clause (Art. 
125 TFEU), but simply the already now proverbial “addition of a few words” to one or at a 
maximum two articles in the Treaty, among them Art. 122 TFEU. Just adding a reference to 
financial stability in Art. 122 was obviously assessed to be sufficient to satisfy the German 
Constitutional Court. At the same time it was intended to serve as a solid legal basis for the 
new permanent crisis solution mechanism which might amount to a permanent EFSF and 
will not necessarily explicitly appear in the wording of any Treaty change explicitly. The 
reason is that the “permanent EFSF” as a new EU institution falls outside Part 3 of the 
TFEU, and therefore cannot be created according to the simplified revision procedure (Gros, 
ó Broin and Kaczy ski, 2010). The perspective of an only small Treaty change which allows 
for the use of the simplified treaty revision procedure and avoids the need for a 5
referendum, let all 27 members agree. Another driving force was the insight that no crisis 
solution or insurance mechanism would be realistic which is not supported by the two 
largest (donor) euro area countries (Belke, 2010b, Gros, ó Broin and Kaczy ski, 2010, 
Haede, 2010).   
The summit meeting also came up with the conclusion that the IMF would play a role in the 
new mechanism, but did not make its role more concrete (Belke, 2010b). This probably 
implies that the new mechanism will be accessible only to governments which have 
complied with IMF conditionality as it was the case with respect to the recent rescue 
package for Greece. 
Seen on the whole, the situation does not seem to be under control up to now. Sovereign 
bond spreads are flickering these days to heights not seen during the last months.  On 
November 12, 2010, spreads in Portugal were close to 500bp per cent. In Spain, spreads 
were approaching the 230bp level at the height of the Spanish crisis in the summer, and 
the Belgian spreads have reached 100bp for the first time. Italian spreads also went up, 
though pressure has lowered a little bit in Ireland – but this is probably due to some 
support from the ECB. The explanation for these lingering doubts is quite simple: the 
problems that underlie the crisis (the precarious state of Greek public finances and that of 
the Spanish real estate sector) have not been solved.  
It cannot be excluded that – within the next weeks - politicians will be forced to go for 
quick shots. The main danger is that there is no fallback position if countries beyond 
Ireland have to be rescued. Up to now there is a legal vacuum how to organize orderly and 
unscheduled default in the euro area (in contrast to the detailed descriptions underlying 
international bonds issued by emerging market countries). The EFSF framework was meant 
to but would not cover the worst case in which Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland would 
all become needy. However, in reality the true liability limit of the EFSF framework would 
not be able to cover the case of, for instance, Spain, if the smaller countries would have 
become needy as well. The reason is that significant sums have to be deducted from the 
EFSF’s total volume of 440 billion euro beforehand for general stabilization measures and 
maybe also - and this is often forgotten – utilized for guaranteeing some donors’ claims. 
Large-scale problems of the status quo
The scale of the current debt problem is large. For Greece, 110 billion euro have already 
been agreed upon. The EFSF plus EFSM headline amounts to a nominal value of 500 billion 
euro, which in reality corresponds to a sum of 255 billion euros, due to a couple of 
deductions. Most importantly, only those countries can act as guarantors for other states if 
they have a triple-A rating, i.e. the highest credit rating: Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Luxembourg.
1 If the needs of Ireland and Portugal are 
considered to be of the same magnitude as Greece, this directly implies that the package 
might not be able to deal with Spain. If Portugal and Ireland turn to the EFSF then only the 
ECB can prevent financial market meltdown.  
The first basic problem addresses the fact that the euro area is a monetary union, but not a 
fiscal or even political union. This is precisely why there is no guarantee clause (note that 
we later on argue that Art. 125 TFEU is not a ‘no bail out’ clause). “No bail out” is not 
credible with integrated financial markets. When markets are close to meltdown creditors 
have little choice. 
Deciding on the way of “bailing in” the private sector is the second fundamental problem.
The European Council was faced on October 29 with the pioneering question whether it 
should  agree on a permanent ‘crisis resolution mechanism’ demanded by markets and 
debtor countries in exchange of a ‘bail in’ mechanism as demanded by Germany. The 
existence of the turning point per se and its actual solution have initiated huge turmoil in 
the markets. 
1 Correspondingly, the IMF would provide net credits at the amount of only 160 billion euro. In sum, analysts 
estimate that, hence, a total of 475 billion euro could be paid out as financial support. 6
Hence, details of the envisaged involvement of the private sector should be resolved 
quickly. Should it take place always? Should one re-design the timetable of repayments 
without altering the present value of the former (rescheduling) or even diminish the 
present value down to a level which appears to be sufficient to arrive at sustainable public 
finances (restructuring)? What about haircuts? Should they only be applied to new debt or 
should old debt also be considered?  
Otherwise we might see tensions rising between the “North” and the “South” of the euro 
area. On the one hand, there is the view of the German Chancellor Mrs. Merkel who 
interprets Art. 125 TFEU as a “no bail out clause” and argues accordingly that the monetary 
union cannot become a transfer union. Hence, the “North” sees a member state failure as 
an option. This necessitates tough conditionality and rules for orderly bankruptcy. On the 
other hand, Mr. Trichet – really standing for the “South”? - does not stop claiming that “we 
are all in the same boat”. In that sense, a member state should not be left alone if it is in 
trouble. In the extreme, this view implies that there is neither a plan B necessary nor is 
there any floor to the rating of collateral foreseen at the ECB.
2 
In the wake of the October 29 European Council, the tensions between the “North” and the 
“South” came back on the scene. The aim of policy should thus not only be to prevent 
failures, rather it should also prepare for it. An EMF could be based on permanent EFSF. 
Since the available collective action clauses are insufficient, there is the necessity of 
mopping up law. 
It has to be mentioned that there are a couple of differences in sovereign and private 
defaults. Therefore, sovereign-debt crisis are more complicated to deal with, since 
instruments to handle the situation in an orderly way are much more limited than in the 
case of private debt. In the latter case, the problem can be solved by liquidating the 
borrower’s assets and, referring to corporations, dissolving the organization (Gianviti et al., 
2010, p. 19). 
These preliminaries should serve as the background against which missing or redundant 
and/or unworkable elements within the Commission package can be identified. 
3. Missing or redundant/unworkable elements within the 
Commission package 
Unworkable?  SGP sanctions and voting 
An important issue is to what extent quasi-automatic sanctions and a reversal of the 
burden of proof in the EDP would influence market perceptions. It is conceivable that in this 
case alone the triggering of the EDP could lead to major reactions by market participants. 
However, this problem is also inherent in the proposals referring to the permanent crisis 
resolution mechanism – although in a few of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
(SDRM)-type proposals this is intended to be mitigated by inferring the role of a “judge” to 
the SDRM (section 3). On the other hand, such a change in processes of this kind – just like 
the European semester – would clearly signal a paradigm shift towards more serious 
budget coordination that could be rewarded by the markets. 
Missing: strong incentives to stick to the rules
A  more comprehensive framework of ex-ante policy coordination including a “European 
Semester[a1] ” has been decided by the Council. Procedural changes to the Semester may be 
implemented after the European Parliament has voiced its concerns in the coming months. 
In the latter it would examine the individual countries’ budget plans and then issue 
recommendations for corrective action based not only on each country’s fiscal trajectory, 
but also on the aggregate implications of the individual plans. This framework aims at 
keeping individual countries to their fiscal targets and at avoiding persistent and large 
intra-euro area imbalances. But it is left open what could actually force countries to change 
their budget plans according to the Commission’s recommendations in times of conflict. The 
2 I gratefully acknowledge comments from Daniel Gros on this issue. 7
Commission also suggests that countries exceeding the SGP deficit ceilings should be 
forced to set aside funds in interest bearing deposits. But again: “what makes us think that 
these interest bearing deposits would be enforced, when the fines already envisaged in the 
SGP have never been levied” (Annunziata, 2010)? Commission proposals would then have 
to be rejected by a qualified majority of the Council. But in scenarios like the current one in 
which the qualified majority of member countries have preferences which go beyond the 
notion of EU economic governance as a mere hardening of the SGP, credible enforcement 
of budget discipline might become a difficult task even in good times (Belke, 2010, p. 15). 
The simple but obvious and central problem inherent in both the old and the proposed “new 
and improved” SGP is that none of them disposes of any mechanism to override national 
sovereignty. Taxing and spending decisions rightly rest with the elected representatives of 
each individual country - and since there seems to be no appetite for full political union at 
least in the former hard currency countries (Annunziata, 2010, Neumann, 2010), this is 
quite safely not going to change. 
Missing: clear definition of the IMF’s role 
Is there any, and if yes, what role for the IMF? The H. van Rompuy Task Force enumerates 
the role of the IMF among the issues to be addressed for a new future permanent 
mechanism. Especially with an eye on the very strong conditionality under which 
programmes like a permanent crisis solution mechanism should operate. The IMF is 
mentioned neither in the COM proposal nor in the recent EP positions. 
Critical but unavoidably missing (after end-of-October EU summit): reversed 
qualitative majority voting on SGP sanctions and withdrawal of voting rights 
The results of the recent EU summit have to be appreciated if indeed a crisis solution 
mechanism which really deserves its name will result in the end. It would put an end to the 
large-scale problems described in section 1 – especially because it would terminate the role 
of the ECB as the bad bank of the euro area. The very existence of this mechanism would 
be much more important than the withdrawal of voting rights in EU committees, if a 
country repeatedly cheats with respect to the deficit rules. In terms of game theory, the 
threat of withdrawal of voting rights has been strategically employed as a "whipping boy", 
in order to dispose of some items to sacrifice for a package deal.  
What is more, a hardened Stability and Growth Pact has to be regarded more as a 
complement than a true alternative to a successfully designed government insolvency 
mechanism. Hence, one could feel legitimized to argue that an only partial hardening 
without „automatic“ sanctions, as it is now envisaged, is acceptable. Particularly since the 
majority of the proposals by the EU Commission to provide the SGP with sharper teeth, is 
still included in the package (Belke, 2010).  
Unworkable: differentiation between proposals for eurozone and non-eurozone 
countries 
With regard to economic policy, the differentiation between proposals for euro area and 
non-euro area countries is likely to become an issue. Such a differentiation is made in the 
documents drawn up by the Commission and is supported by the H. van Rompuy task 
force: potential sanctions and conditionality will play a lesser role with non-euro area 
countries. Also scoreboard thresholds may be different between euro area and non-euro 
area countries.  
Whereas leaving room for convergence might be a plausible first glance argument in favour 
of this unequal treatment, the question looming on the horizon is whether and by how 
much an economic “core Europe” could decouple itself from the non-euro area countries 
and, by this, indirectly lower their probability to enter the euro area in the future.  It is thus 
overall plausible to take “into consideration the very close interconnections with non-euro 
area economies, especially those that are expected to join the euro area, as part of the new 
multilateral surveillance framework and the enhanced instruments of the SGP and, in 
particular, a stronger focus of the MTFO” (Feio, 2010).  8
This issue is relevant since - with respect to the issue of a crisis solution mechanism (on 
which the EU Commission is silent) - Mr. Feio is correctly claiming that it should also be 
carefully assessed whether non-euro area Member States could possibly join the European 
financial stabilisation mechanism on a case-by-case basis and after fulfilling pre-defined 
criteria.  
Unworkable: interpretation of Art. 125 TFEU as a strict “no bail-out clause” 
Upon closer examination, one reading of the Article is that countries like Greece do not 
have a legal entitlement for guarantees or even payments from the Union and other 
member states but that it does not prohibit the former. However, the EFSF framework has 
de facto been established anyway. There is thus a clear need of changing the factual 
constraints. Otherwise Art. 125 TFEU would become toothless. In this sense, the “no bail-
out” rule under a solution like the EMF would be more credible than the “no” under Art. 125 
TFEU.  
Redundant: a scoreboard establishing a set of indicators revealing external and 
internal imbalances 
Basically, it makes much sense to avoid ‘harmful’ macroeconomic imbalances. But up to 
now there is no technical solution for the problem of determining the exact threshold 
beyond which an existing imbalance is ‘harmful’ and to whom it is harmful ex ante. 
However, there is point in more generally monitoring large external deficits (and also the 
share of foreign debt in overall debt figures playing a role within the Commission package). 
The latter make countries prone to a ‘sudden stop’ to the capital inflows and the connected 
dangerous dislocations in financial markets potentially spreading all over the euro area 
(Gros, 2010a). Since the public deficits are frequently driven by private deficits – as in the 
cases of Ireland and Spain – also the Eurosystem bears a large part of responsibilities in 
allowing bubbles in national housing markets and the associated increases in private debt 
to develop (de Grauwe, 2010).  
It directly follows that the best policy response does not seem to be a narrow focus on 
competitiveness indicators, but rather on the prevention of underlying causes of the 
imbalance, which are usually divergences in domestic demand (often driven by credit-
financed real estate and/or consumption booms). Or even wait for the automatic reversal of 
the imbalances. This might be a favourable and dominant strategy with an eye on the 
German example according to which current account surpluses led to a stimulus for 
domestic demand which, in turn, supports wage growth, ceteris paribus lowers 
competitiveness and the current account surplus. Hence, one of the basic insights of 
international economics is that current account imbalances are endogenous and driven by 
autonomous and complex savings and investment decisions. What is more, it should be 
clear that a specific country cannot import more than it exports for an unlimited time and 
the other way round. If at all, thus, any focus should be put on the duration of imbalances 
not on the imbalances per se. But again: who should decide on the threshold? And on what 
basis?  
Moreover, a rigid and mechanical application of such a large assemblage of different 
indicators may lead to ambiguous results and, thus, lead to confusion. This, in turn, would 
negatively impact on the effectiveness of monitoring and potential sanctioning. For 
instance, how to react if some indicators point at one direction and a couple of others at 
another? How to aggregate the evidence? If aggregation is agreed upon, what are the 
weights? Anyway, most cases in which member states get into difficulties cannot be exactly 
traced back to the empirical realization of one or another economic indicator. Instead, 
these cases are related to inadequate governance of an array of imbalances prevalent 
within a country (Bruegel, 2010, Fahrholz and Wójcik, 2010).  
Finally, a definite strength of the proposals contained in the EU Commission package is that 
it is not treating surplus and deficit countries symmetrically. By this, it proves to take a 
true global perspective and to acknowledge the negative effects on the international 
competitiveness of the euro area that would emerge with respect to the rest of the world in 
case of adjusting competitiveness indicators in a symmetric fashion (Belke, Schnabl and 9
Zemanek, 2010). Opponents to this view appear to be driven by the (wrong) perception 
that the deficits of some member countries are numerically exactly offset by the surplus of 
others, i.e. in a symmetrical way. Of course it is tempting now to apply closed economy 
reasoning and to suggest that both enhancing competitiveness of the deficit countries and 
lowering competitiveness of the surplus countries lead to a reduction of imbalances, since 
competitiveness is always defined in relative terms. But the euro area is faced with an 
increasing degree of globalization and would thus as a whole really suffer welfare losses 
from any competitive adjustment ‘to the middle’, in terms of an overall loss of 
competitiveness for the entire area (Bruegel, 2010).  
To summarize, as frequently warned by economists like Richard Baldwin, the EU 
Commission and national governments are expected to have great difficulties in steering 
trade and current account deficits. Concrete numerical goals as also discussed at the recent 
G 20-summit are not more than catchwords. Hence, it turned out to be a nearly safe bet 
that governments agreed upon more than the mere closing declarations, because anything 
else would be too difficult to implement.  
European semester: unworkable element? 
The European semester has the potential to be extensively discussed by EU leaders. 
Thereby, the treatment and integration of national parliaments disposing of budgetary 
prerogatives will continue to represent a critical issue. As experience shows, the national 
parliaments tend to insist on exercising their rights which makes a European peer review of 
draft budgets prior to the national budget process an event of low probability in the near 
future. This creates a constitutional problem which could not be solved by integrating the 
European Parliament. These problems notwithstanding, the European semester would even 
be useful for an effective coordination by means of the exchange of information and 
creating transparency of information flows (Belke, 2010, and the sources cited therein).  
Before finally addressing some general considerations, one should stress that both 
concessions - the commitment by the EU Council to promise the UK lower growth rates of 
future EU budgets and the planned specific treatment of the costs of structural and pension 
reforms in the CEECs within the deficit procedures - represent justifiable sacrifices to arrive 
at a sound “package deal” at the October EU Summit – mainly due to their sustainable 
effects on future public finances (Belke, 2010).  
General remarks 
The European Council agreed to follow most of the proposals included in the EU 
Commission package, i.e. to tighten the SGP and to set up a system aimed at reducing 
macroeconomic imbalances produced by a lack of convergence of economic policies within 
the euro area. It obviously took the view that the main source of the euro area debt crisis 
has been the “misconduct” of national governments which have permitted their budget 
deficits and debt levels to explode and have implemented too few measures to avoid 
divergent movements in their economies. While this view is partly true, it clearly neglects 
the “hot potato game” characterizing the financial crisis, i.e. the fact that unsustainable 
increases in private debt (of households and financial institutions) forced many 
governments to bail out the private sector (and, in the end, forced the ECB to collect the 
pieces). Excessive bank credit enables the emergence of these bubbles and made them 
more intense, as could be seen in Ireland and Spain. In the long run, only the central bank 
but not the governments can control bank credit, the conditions for lending and the 
development of unsustainable private debt levels (de Grauwe, 2010).  
Reforms of the economic governance in the euro area should therefore not only focus on 
the serious responsibilities of national governments - as done in the Commission package - 
but also on those of the European monetary authorities, and in particular those of the 
ECB.  After the Lehman collapse, European policy (including monetary policy and the EU 
Commission package) followed the principle that the insolvency of governments and banks 
had to be prevented under all circumstances and accepting any costs.  With an eye on the 
sustained bond market turbulences, this way could be labeled as a fiction. The compromise 10
agreed upon at the European Council meeting of 28-29 October clearly turns away from 
this principle and, thus, should be basically welcomed. The status quo European rescue 
package has to be urgently substituted by a permanent crisis mechanism. And this has to 
do with current ECB monetary policy: the level of the current ECB main refinancing interest 
rate shields Ireland and Greece from insolvency. This is an important aspect neither taken 
into account nor explicitly tackled within the EU Commission package.  
All the discussions about a potential „bail-out“ of countries within the framework of the 
current rescue package neglect the fact that a much larger bail-out can be read off the ECB 
balance sheet. With a focus on the purchases of "toxic" government bonds by the ECB 
within the SMP, it can be argued that the ECB intervenes in “dysfunctional markets” for 
government debt in a sterilized but completely discretionary manner. This must effectively 
lead to a redistribution of risk among member states (Belke, 2010).  
However, an even more alarming aspect the public might not be sufficiently aware of is 
that the ECB supports the respective member countries and their banks in the framework 
of its ordinary monetary policy operations. The ECB grants the troubled and distressed 
commercial banks to refinance hundreds of billion euro, i.e. 40 to 50 percent of GDP for 
Ireland respectively Greece, at a one percent interest rate. As expressed in the FT Editorial 
from November 16, 2010: “Irish banks only survive thanks to European Central Bank 
lending: they currently suck up about a quarter of the ECB’s liquidity provision. … But the 
sickliness is part of why sovereign yields have spiked, troubling the bond market of other 
peripheral European states.” Without this transfer of nearly free money, both countries 
would almost certainly have gone bankrupt some time ago. Assuming that Greek banks 
should have to pay the same risk premium as the Greek government, ECB lending to 
Greece amounts to a subsidy worth more than the transfer from the EU Structural Funds 
(Gros, 2010b). Notably, referring to QE by the Fed is no excuse here, because US QE 
cannot at all be compared to the quasi-QE programmes conducted by the Fed, since the 
latter does not target its bond purchases to, for instance, Florida or other specific federal 
states.  
As mentioned in section 1, the ECB is now the buyer of only resort for Irish bonds, possibly 
the only policy institution able to prevent the collapse in Irish and Portuguese bonds from 
spreading.  But this may imply that Mr. Trichet has to ignore opposition from within the 
ECB council to the ECB’s bond-buying program and further expand purchases of sovereign 
assets.  
Taking these considerations as a starting point, it seems fair to state that the 
Commission/Euro Group do not have submitted a proper adjustment programme which 
really covers the central issues. Just changing the SGP which represents a significant part 
of the Commission package is not the issue – this appears to be not more than a sideshow 
which will not lead to significant solutions to the large-scale problems of the euro area 
described earlier. A further central problem would be the democratic legitimacy of imposing 
fines according to the exact realization of figures. This in itself speaks in favour of a 
bottom-up approach in the shape of, for instance, fiscal limits hard-coded into each 
country’s legislation in the form of automatic, binding and unchangeable rules (Belke, 
2010). Hence, one should deal with the question neglected by the Commission package: 
"What happens, if …?". Let us now check what (if anything) is missing outside and beyond 
the proposals in order to make the whole package of governance reform complete and 
workable.  11
4. What (if anything) is missing outside and beyond the proposals in 
order to make the whole package of governance reform complete 
and workable?
Eurobonds – really missing? 
Mr. Juncker recently proposed a European bond. He said he would make a formal proposal 
for a common Eurozone bond. He is quoted as saying: "It's an intelligent way to keep 
economically weaker euro countries attractive for investors in the future." However, this 
argument should not be bought completely. The only argument to justify the introduction of 
Eurobonds is to defragment the EU bond market and to create an alternative for Chinese 
(or Russian) investors who up to now still invest in safe T-bills – in spite of increasing 
doubts in the US macro policy stance and their fear of returns being inflated away after a 
while. Since the euro area should be prepared to go for larger current account deficits if 
China will stick to its export model also in the future (as all projections say) and the US 
really strive for lower deficits, defragmenting bond markets might be a contribution to 
lower global imbalances (in accordance with the position by Mrs. Berès on the crisis 
resolution mechanism). The arguments speaking against the introduction of Eurobonds are 
broadly similar to those brought in against the Securities Market Programme (SMP) and, 
hence, shall not be enumerated again.  
Missing? Bank recapitalization as a condition-sine-qua-non 
As shown in section 1, large-scale problems of the status quo appear at the surface in the 
euro area because there has not been any solution to the deficiencies which drive the crisis, 
among them the still alarming stances of the Spanish real estate sector and Greek public 
finances. In this context, it is remarkable that the proposals do not tackle at all the still 
significant undercapitalization of the European banking system – a second important 
driving force of unsettled financial markets. Gros (2010), for instance, reports based on 
euro area statistics that for every capital loss of one euro held by some euro area bank, 
there is about €20 of doubtful debt (liabilities including interbank debt).  
But, strikingly, all proposals implicitly assume that European funding will be used only to 
bail out governments which in turn might apply these funds to bail out their own banks. 
The word “bank” does not even appear in any of the proposals although the banking issue 
is deeply connected with the state of public finances and the necessary volume of an 
emergency fund. But, taking the 20:1 liability-capital ratio in the banking sector as a 
starting point, this way of handling this critical issue implies that the public funding 
requirements within a potential crisis resolution mechanism may become much higher than 
if undercapitalization would be dealt with directly (Gros, 2010). The proposals should at 
least mention these fundamental relations and, even better, explicitly combine their 
concepts with a hint at the need for continuous rigorous stress testing of euro area banks 
and subsequent mandatory recapitalization (as long as Basle III is not fixed but only agreed 
upon by the G-20). It is necessary but not sufficient to blame the Club Med countries for 
unsustainable fiscal policies.  
However, these insights have to be carefully weighed against that fact that the root of the 
problem in Ireland (i.e. the source of doubt about its solvency) is the government’s overly 
strong commitment to bank bondholders at any costs. This might translate into a great risk 
for the taxpayer since ECB Vice-President Vitor Constâncio has publicly considered that 
EFSF money could be used to back Irish banks. This paper argues that this would, however, 
be a mistake and, thus, sovereign bonds will then continue to be under pressure. “It would 
also give an official EU imprimatur on Europe’s dirty secret: public treasuries will do 
anything to make private bank creditors whole. Committing this mistake to stop the 
contagion of panic in government debt will only make it worse. Propping up banks whose 
losses have still not been fully realised cannot possibly improve sovereign creditworthiness” 
(FT Editorial, November 15, 2010). 12
Missing in the Commission package: establishment of a crisis solution mechanism 
The European Monetary Fund 
The EMF and the EP position 
What has certainly been missing within the proposals by the EU Commission in order to 
make the whole package of governance reform complete and workable is the scheduled 
establishment of a crisis solution mechanism. However, this lack seems to be resolved by 
the agreements reached at the recent EU Council.  
In accordance with Feio (2010), this briefing paper argues that one should “establish a 
permanent mechanism or body (a European Monetary Fund), after due examination of its 
pros and cons, which should not take more than one year, to be an overseer of sovereign 
debt developments and to complement the SGP as a mechanism of last resort for cases in 
which market financing is no longer available for a government and/or member state 
exposed to balance of payments problems; it shall be based on existing mechanisms (the 
European Financial Stability Facility, the European financial stabilisation mechanism and the 
European balance of payments assistance instrument) and shall include clear rules inter alia 
on the following aspects: a) membership criteria, such as fulfilling the minimum 
requirements for national budgetary rules/institutions, b) decision-making procedures and 
funding, c) conditionality for exceptional loans, d) monitoring and e) resources and powers; 
such a mechanism should not limit the powers of the budgetary authorities to establish the 
EU budget at an appropriate level, should avoid moral hazard and be consistent with state 
aid principles and the consequences of ignoring them.” This paper later on checks whether 
these conditions are fulfilled in case of the EMF. 
The crisis solution mechanism must not necessarily take the form of an EMF but could in 
principle also consist of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism ( S D R M )  à  l a  I M F  
(Krueger, 2002, Rogoff and Zettelmeyer, 2002a,b) which was originally designed to cope 
with defaults of emerging market countries such as Argentina. But the facts that (a) the 
SDRM seems to take more a (softer) role of a “judge” between creditors and debtors and 
(b) there is a legal vacuum how to organize orderly and unscheduled default in the euro 
area (in contrast to the detailed descriptions underlying international bonds issued by 
emerging market countries which have been addressed by the SDRM point at the necessity 
of installing an EMF. 
EMF substituting ECB as the bad bank for the euro area 
A European Monetary Fund according to the model designed by Daniel Gros and Thomas 
Mayer might well represent the blueprint of an orderly sovereign default mechanism which 
really deserves its name (Gros and Mayer, 2010a). It would contribute decisively to release 
the ECB from her role as a bad bank and to let the debtor countries and the creditors 
participate in the costs of sovereign default according to the costs-by-cause principle. 
Otherwise, the reputation of the ECB would be damaged too much and one would slip 
deeper and deeper into a transfer union.  
Even more important from a strategic point of view, an EMF does not systematically 
discriminate against smaller countries and takes away any German-French dominance from 
the mechanism (smaller countries complained about both issues after Deauville). An IMF 
mitigates the currently increasing tensions between larger and smaller member countries, 
the latter feeling patronized by the former. This is because every member country would, 
according to the envisaged financing mechanism, be called to account proportionally to its 
GDP if it breaches the Maastricht fiscal criteria. However, its probability of realisation could 
be larger if it would not be seen as a competitor of the IMF on an international level and 
especially so by US officials (for a deeper discussion of the IMF-EMF relationship see Belke, 
2010). 
Status quo only moves the day of reckoning 
The results of the most recent EU summit suggest that politicians finally realized that 
unlimited financing of insolvency-prone countries and banks will not be tenable any more. 13
This change of mind constitutes the ultimate merit of the agreements made during the 
summit. Any hardening of the SGP could be unlimitedly pursued and are welcome as a 
complement to an EMF.  
But independent on whether the rules are endowed with sanctions or not and on the case 
costs-by-cause principle, the costs of avoiding default still accrue in any to the community 
of the remaining member states. The default-prone governments still keep their threat 
potential since their default would cause systemic costs which are generally perceived as 
prohibitively high. What is more, the solvency of the saviour countries has to be 
safeguarded which tends to increase the costs in cascades. 
Seen on the whole, thus, the status quo has not been an effective solution for insolvent 
debtors; it merely frontloaded the day of final reckoning to some day in the future. In 
addition, it makes debtor countries hooked on it. Since access to the ECB’s ordinary 
monetary policy operations is the cheapest way of refinancing, the distressed banks will 
even steadily increase their dependence from this source (Gros, 2010b). This process will 
finally lead to a concentration of bad risks on the ECB balance sheet as described in detail 
in Belke (2010). 
The ECB and the EFSF have assumed the allocation function of capital markets, since they 
decide in a completely discretionary manner which countries and which banks are granted 
access to (re-) financing at which costs.  
The European Monetary Fund: a preferable blueprint 
Let me now briefly elaborate on how to interpret the EMF proposal by Gros and Mayer 
which incorporates many elements not included in the EU Commission package but is in 
strong compliance with Feio (2010) (Belke, 2010a, Gros and Mayer, 2010).  
Pre-empting the end game, i.e. recognize sovereign default as “ultima ratio” for a country 
in financial distress, and limiting moral hazard of debtors and creditors by charging the 
former for excessive deficits and debt and imposing haircuts on the latter for imprudent 
lending are among the key goals of a European Monetary (Stability) Fund. In this respect, 
the EMF proposal is in accordance with Feio (2010) (“such a mechanism should … avoid 
moral hazard …”). 
The key principles of the EMF are as follows. It allows sovereign default at minimal cost in 
terms of systemic stability and public expense. It puts a floor under the market price of 
debt in default through guarantees and/or debt exchange. This floor contains contagion as 
the downside for debt of other countries is also limited (note that Spain’s public debt share 
at GDP amounted not more than 60 percent at the start of the debt crisis). Concerning 
haircuts, the nominal value of debt after the haircut shall amount to 60% of GDP of the 
defaulting country. The idea is that telling markets what the haircut will be would keep the 
defaulted bonds tradeable in secondary markets and prevent complete market chaos. And 
what is the benefit to the creditors? The only alternative for a private creditor would be a 
much bigger haircut. Gros and Mayer think of GDP warrants to align the interests of 
creditors and debtors. Since the EMF might become the sole or at least the principal 
creditor of the defaulting country (directly through exchange or indirectly through 
guarantee) the political leverage of EU framework can be applied to discipline the “debt 
sinners” (Belke, 2010a, Gros and Mayer, 2010). 
Stage 1 in debt workout consists of guarantees granted by the EMF. The typical situation to 
start from is a country in trouble which has lost its market access and financial markets 
which are area wide in turmoil because the size of losses is uncertain. In this case, the EMF 
agrees with the country on the adjustment program and provides adjustment funding. The 
EMF puts a floor on the value of debt by guaranteeing x% of payment obligations (with x% 
of debt = 60% of GDP). As a part of an EMF-led adjustment program, the country 
negotiates restructuring with private creditors. GDP warrants are again a key element. 
Creditors whose claims are due during the adjustment program get the same treatment 
(Belke, 2010a, Gros and Mayer, 2010). 14
There are strong incentives for a stage 1 debt workout because the guarantee prevents the 
price of debt from undershooting and, hence, potentially fatal mark-downs in the trading 
book of creditors. The debtor country negotiates in good faith with creditors on re-
structuring as this paves the way for adjustment funding. The creditors negotiate in good 
faith with the country as they can expect to raise the recovery rate above the guarantee 
rate. The question here is whether GDP warrants are the best way to align incentives. 
These negotiations could well be accompanied by rules which should be conducive to 
relatively early engagement of creditors and debtors in an exchange of information and 
views on the current situation in order to reduce the uncertainty of the creditors (Gianviti et 
al., 2010, Krueger, 2002).  
As stage 2 in the debt workout, Gros and Mayer (2010) provide for a debt exchange. If 
adjustment is unsuccessful, the EMF becomes the sole creditor of the insolvent country 
through (mandatory) debt exchange. The EMF imposes further conditionality, i.e. limits on 
new borrowing, on the insolvent country so as to assure that the country can repay the 
EMF. Any European mechanism would need to include measures to safeguard the 
impartiality between creditors and debtors of the debt restructuring process (Gianviti et al., 
2010). Any breach of the conditions and/or the default on the EMF would mean a breach of 
EU Treaty obligations. Hence, leaving the euro area and ultimately dispensing with the 
benefits of the EU are the dire consequence.
3 This part of the EMF proposal fulfills the 
demands outlined in Feio (2010) that the new mechanism should include rules for 
conditionality for exceptional loans and that one needs clear rules for the powers of the 
Fund. 
An important element of the EMF procedure is represented by the disincentives to move to 
stage 2 of the debt workout. This is because the latter would imply a longer-term loss of 
access to capital market, reduced access for the banking sector to ECB funds as 
government bonds would no longer be eligible as collateral, a loss of political sovereignty 
and a potential exit from EMU and EU. This is again in strict accordance with the position 
presented in Feio (2010) (“such a mechanism should … be consistent with state aid 
principles and the consequences of ignoring them”). 
The EMF could substitute the status quo solution consisting of a combination of the EFSF 
plus the ECB. The EFSF now exists (without any Treaty change!), but only for sovereign 
default prevention. And the ECB is engaged in “debt exchange” in “dysfunctional” bond 
markets. This means that the redeployment of the 440 billion Fund would be more than 
enough for a start-up funding of the EMF and, even more important, would take the ECB 
out of the business of lender of last resort to EMU sovereigns. In this respect, the EMF 
proposal closely corresponds to the position described in Feio (2010): “it shall be based on 
existing mechanisms”. 
The EMF funding in the future is by automatic ‘sanctions’. Gros and Mayer propose an extra 
levy on countries that breach the Maastricht criteria: X % of excess debt defined as actual 
debt (% GDP) – 60% with X < 1 and Y % of excess deficit defined as actual deficit (% 
GDP) – 3% with Y > 1. This property closely corresponds to Feio: “the mechanism … should 
include clear rules inter alia on … membership criteria, such as fulfilling the minimum 
requirements for national budgetary rules/institutions … and funding …” and “ … clear rules 
for … resources …”. 
The EMF should be endowed with professional staff and independence. According to Gros 
and Mayer, the staff of the EMF should be independent and make assessments free of 
political imperatives. The open question is whether it should be a new institution or a 
special, shielded, part of Commission. Also rules for decision-making procedures as 
requested by Feio (2010) are not clarified up to now. Failures of the pre-WWII Gold 
3 Fahrholz and Wójcik (2010) argue that specifying conditions for leaving the EMU would work through several 
channels. Overall, making exit costs and procedures explicit would raise the perceived costs of a legally possible 
exit relative to the short-term political costs of economic adjustment. This would be a deterrent to brinkmanship, 
stimulate fiscal discipline and lower the scope of the inherent negative externality problem within the euro area. 
Haede (2010), however, takes a more critical view on this issue. 15
Standard led to the IMF. An analogue is the EMU crisis which might lead to an EMF (Belke, 
2010a, Gros and Mayer, 2010).  
Concerning the “EMF versus IMF” dichotomy, Daniel Gros is right in arguing that a “virtual 
EMF” could be carved out of European Department of the IMF. Since there might be an 
incentive for a unified euro area representation within the IMF, a natural corollary would be 
that EFSF would then represent euro area interests inside the IMF (Gros, 2010c).  
Although they appear rather similar at first glance, there are a couple of key differences 
between the EMF proposal and the ECB’s crisis management institution (CMI) worth 
mentioning here (on the CMI which has been proposed by the ECB without any recourse to 
the necessity of a treaty change see Belke, 2010): within the ECB proposal, sovereign 
default is not an option and financial support comes at penalty rates. An important question 
is whether the CMI would really conduct purchases of debt in ‘dysfunctional’ markets at 
“market” prices. A well-informed guess would be that these are not true market prices if 
the CMI and/or the ECB are the buyers of last resort even if the bonds are bought at less 
than at par (Belke, 2010a, Gros and Mayer, 2010).  
There are further problems inherent in the ECB’s suggestion. Without default option, the 
debt exchange likely occurs at prices which are very favourable for creditors and, in 
addition, the ECB will remain the buyer of last resort for the time being. Moreover, it 
remains unclear what happens when a country defaults on claims held by the CMI. Finally, 
as noted by Gianviti et al. (2010), the “ECB’s request for preferred creditor status” within 
the CMI might prove counterproductive, since in this case private creditors would still be 
plagued by the risk of losing their money. Hence, the main question is whether the 
European Parliament and other institutions should really spend more political capital on 
developing an elaborate framework for ‘economic governance’ or whether it should focus on 
reinforcing discipline by making failure possible. 
Reducing contagion is key for financial market stability in the euro area. The mere 
existence of EMF would have reduced the potential for contagion since investors would 
have known that there would not have been any significant losses on Spain with a debt-to-
GDP ratio of not significantly more than 60 percent at the start of the debt crisis (Belke, 
2010a, Gros and Mayer, 2010). Finally, the EMF could also engage in preventive action if its 
prior analysis has shown weak policies. This would correspond to the request of clear rules 
for monitoring in Feio (2010). 
EMF – Legal issues 
An EMF would (probably) be compatible with the Treaty (i.e., necessitate only small 
changes of it). A sovereign insolvency mechanism to which the EU Council has committed 
itself could represent a half-way compromise between a “complete liquidation” and infinite 
financing of weak countries (and banks). This mechanism has to embrace a controlled 
rescheduling or even a debt restructuring in order to avoid the emergence of addicted 
countries being on the drip in the periphery of the euro area (Gros, 2010b). An EMF, for 
instance, fulfills these conditions – even if one would not be forced to call it “EMF”.  
Haede (2010) comes up with a quite skeptic legal evaluation of a Monetary Fund (Haede, 
2010). However, it should be argued that higher payments to the EMF linked to excessive 
deficits are not to be considered as ‘sanctions’ and, thus, not as compatible with the Treaty, 
but as contributions to a mutual insurance scheme. This makes them compatible with the 
basic EU principle that any ‘sanction’ must be somehow related to the aim that is supposed 
to be achieved.  Sanctions such as withdrawing voting rights or zero interest bearing 
deposits (which go to the EU budget) have no direct link to the aim, which is financial 
stability. Also from this point of view, the Commission package seems to be unworkable 
(see section 2). 
If one follows the implicit objectives of the Council and wants to keep Treaty changes to a 
minimum in order to avoid any significant opposition from the member countries, there are 
at least three alternatives (for the first two see in detail Gros, ó Broin and Kaczy ski, 
2010): (1) one could enlarge the scope of Art. 122 TFEU by adding “or if the stability of the 16
euro is threatened”
4, (2) one might add a reference to 143 TFEU in 136 TFEU and, by this, 
enlarge the scope of Art. 143, or simply delete the term “with a derogation”. According to 
Art. 143 TFEU, only member states with a derogation (those which have not adopted the 
euro) can receive financial assistance to deal with balance of payments problems (Giavazzi 
and Spaventa, 2010). In order to structure a ‘planned insolvency’ one could refer to Art. 
114 TFEU (dealing with the completion of the internal market by adoption of harmonising 
legislation).The probability of getting through with a very small Treaty change thus seems 
to be rather high. However, a couple of uncertainties still have to be tackled and resolved.
5 
Seen on the whole, thus, legal concerns should not represent a main barrier for the 
materialisation of an EMF, particularly since it was a core ingredient of the summit 
agreement that Art. 122 TFEU shall be extended. The van Rompuy Task Force should rather 
spend its time until December 2010 to clarify, when exactly the conditions are fulfilled to 
claim that „the whole euro area is in danger“ and to pull the trigger for debt exchange and 
how to cope with the reactions of the financial markets which may anticipate the date of 
reckoning coming even beforehand. 
Problems with EMF debt workout, stage II  
The fact that in the future private creditors will take a share in the costs of a default is 
believed to be the main trigger for panic spreading on the markets in the previous two 
weeks. The EU heads of state have already decided that it will end up like that. Until their 
next summit in December 2010 proposals shall be available how this will be managed in 
the time after mid-2013 when the current rescue package will run out. The uncertainty 
about what will happen thereafter, the fear to be asked to pay up before that date and that 
collective-action clauses are still in the debate are making investors extremely nervous.  
What is more, financial market actors could speculate against a country as soon as the 
expectation manifests itself that it will utilize the crisis mechanism. Some even argue that 
the crisis would be even caused by these linkages. Also the banking system of the default-
prone country might “collapse” since it is dependent on government guarantees. The social 
and political consequences of such a development are incalculable. In the end, exactly the 
opposite of the original intentions would be reached: speculative investors would take 
advantage of the current situation while many small savers suffer damage. Over the 
previous days investors have already withdrawn their money from endangered countries 
like Ireland und Portugal (Bini Smaghi, 2010). 
However, this view appears to be overly pessimistic because the available academic 
literature on the effects of creating a sovereign-debt resolution mechanism on bond yields 
tells us that the introduction of rules (with the involvement of creditors) for coping with 
sovereign default will corroborate the inclination of markets to differentiate between high 
and low quality borrowers and to evaluate loans and bonds accordingly. An insightful study 
in this respect is Eichengreen and Mody (2004) who examine the implications of including 
collective-action clauses in loan contracts for borrowing costs. For a sample of some 2,000 
international bonds, they compare the spreads on bonds subject to UK governing law which 
typically include collective-action clauses, with spreads on bonds subject to US law, which 
do not. Contrary to the assertions of some market participants, they find that collective-
action clauses in fact reduce the cost of borrowing for more credit-worthy issuers who 
appear to benefit from the ability to avail themselves of an orderly restructuring process. In 
contrast, less credit-worthy issuers pay higher spreads. They conjecture that for less credit-
worthy borrowers the advantages of orderly restructuring are offset by the moral hazard 
and default risk associated with the presence of renegotiation-friendly loan provisions.  
Without much ado a straightforward implication would ceteris paribus be for the euro area 
that the introduction of rules for dealing with sovereign default would reinforce market 
4 Note that the German Constitutional Court is about to check whether this would impact on the “no-bail-out” 
clause in Art. 125 TFEU and, hence, change the nature of monetary union and transform the latter into a transfer 
union. See Haede (2010). 
5 Gros, ó Broin and Kaczy ski (2010) enumerate examples in which the ratification even of a minimal Treaty 
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discipline and support “the goal of sustainable public finances laid down in the European 
Treaty, and thereby to the sustainability of the euro itself” (Gianviti et al., 2010). However, 
current and future research should urgently focus on the applicability of the ceteris paribus 
clause. As mentioned in section 1, there appears, for instance, to be a legal vacuum how to 
organize orderly and unscheduled default in the euro area (in contrast to the detailed 
descriptions underlying international bonds issued by emerging market countries). 
Moreover, empirical results by Bradley et al. (2010) indicate that the judicial injection of 
uncertainty into the meaning of crucial contract terms is priced by capital market 
participants in a predictable way. Decisions that increase the risk of repayment by 
sovereigns raise the rate return sovereigns must pay in order to attract international 
capital. Decisions that reduce this risk, in turn, tend to lower the cost of capital that 
sovereigns face. At first glance, this might contradict the findings by Eichengreen and Mody 
(2004). However, the main question to be answered in this context is, of course, whether 
the introduction of rules for dealing with sovereign default enhances or lowers uncertainty 
about repayment.  
A second argument against the (pessimistic) Bini Smaghi view might be that the new 
European crisis resolution mechanism could be designed in a way that private creditors 
would not have any reason to panic. For instance, the new crisis resolution mechanism 
could be formulated in a way that it is not applicable to old debt but only to new credit from 
mid-2013 on. Such kind of a solution would correspond to suggestions put forward by 
Germany’s finance minister Mr. Schaeuble: as soon as a country gets into payment 
difficulties, an austerity and stabilization programme will be activated – just like in spring 
this year in the case of Greece. As a first step, the maturity of those bonds could be 
prolonged which become due within this critical phase. If this is not effective, private 
creditors would have to accept haircuts on their claims as a second step. In return, they 
would be granted guarantees on the remaining parts (both measures are also main 
ingredients of the EMF proposal). 
Involvement of private creditor participation is, for instance, also supported by Bruegel (see 
Gianviti et al., 2010) and the German Council of Economic Advisors (Sachverständigenrat, 
2010).  Bruegel recommends that euro area countries should be allowed to issue new 
bonds only if a fixed crisis resolution mechanism including an involvement of private 
creditors is in place. The German Council of Economic Advisors even goes a step further. It 
proposes that private creditors should participate in a stabilisation programme if the EU 
Commission has proposed sanctions against a deficit country. This proposal refers to 
countries which have actively offended the rules of the SGP but not to governments which 
got into payment difficulties through no fault of their own, for instance, by a financial crisis. 
Whereas the more general line of Bruegel deserves support, the latter recommendation 
might go too far. It appears to be too early to involve private creditors before payment 
difficulties have occurred. Moreover, for all practical purposes it turns out rather difficult to 
distinguish whether a country got into distress through no fault or fault of their own. Seen 
on the whole, thus, this paper argues that private creditors should (be forced to) take into 
account (by an incentive structure like the EMF) that a solvency problem postponed is a 
problem made intractable and that it is better to make a painful break than draw out the 
agony. 
EMF: Further caveats 
The remaining caveats with respect to the EMF proposal are both related to the EMF’s 
“trigger of debt workout stage 2” issue. Another open flank of the EMF proposal consists of 
the fact that it is not clear up to now how and whether to treat countries suffering distress 
due to excessive private and public consumption (e.g., Greece) differently within the debt 
workout scheme than countries whose budgetary stance suffers from collapsing banks 
(e.g., Ireland). Finally, the issue of how much authority creditors like the EMF have over 
the future stance of the primary surplus and, hence, the extent of austerity in the first 
period after restructuring still remains critical. This is because the rewards to the 
government’s taxing authority depend on the quality of institutions and the citizens’ 
allegiance which in turn is related to sound principles of democracy (Gianviti et al., 2010, 18
Raffer 1990). These are truly decisive questions, also addressing the proponents of an 
otherwise preferable EMF-type solution.  
5. Is an EMF a realistic option? Perspectives after the EU summit 
How large is the probability that something like an EMF will substitute the current 750-
billion euro rescue package? Or is this issue put on the cold storage or even procrastinated? 
The facts point at a high probability that this issue will be decided upon in the near future. 
The Germans have made a package (deal) between the prolongation of the current 
mechanism which will run out in 2013 and the decision about a new follow-up system. The 
willingness of France to talk about a Treaty change is strikingly new. But Germany and 
France might have underestimated the fact that there are 27 national governments within 
the EU and one needs the support of each of them. As could be observed, for instance, at 
the most recent EU Summit, this will be a hard way to go. From a purely legal perspective, 
there are only a few changes in paragraphs necessary. However, these changes have to be 
supported by 27 governments and have to pass the parliaments and potentially even 
referenda.  
Moreover, as already argued above, the EMF’s probability of realisation could be larger if it 
were not be seen as a competitor of the IMF on an international level and especially so 
from the US. Will there be enough political leadership to cope with implicit US pressure with 
an eye on the fact that IMF involvement is not explicitly dealt with in the Commission 
package (section 2)? At the same time it can be shown that the IMF and the EMF can well 
co-exist (see section on the EMF in this paper). 
Our considerations in the section on “EMF – legal issues” have demonstrated that a slight 
change in Art. 122 should be enough to satisfy the German Constitutional Court and at the 
same time provide a solid legal basis for the “new post-2013 permanent EFSF” (Gros, ó 
Broin and Kaczy ski, 2010) which will probably not be explicitly referred to in any Treaty 
changes. The new mechanism could then probably be developed and made effective on an 
intergovernmental basis. In case of too much resistance against an EMF as such, it might 
not necessarily involve the creation of a new institution. Instead, it could take the form of 
an emergency financing mechanism which is run by the EU Council. Its activation would, 
however, for political reasons necessitate unanimity as is the case in the existing EFSF 
(Gros, ó Broin and Kaczy ski, 2010).  
The recent EU summit agreement on a limited Treaty change gives leeway for deciding 
about the important details of the new “permanent EFSF”. Given that only a few weeks 
remain until the EC meeting in December and with an eye on the fact that any solution will 
hinge on Germany’s financial contribution, it appears not unlikely that we will see a mere 
prolongation of the EFSF but with new livery. So this paper buys the view taken by Gros, ó 
Broin and Kaczy ski (2010) that “the new permanent EFSF” will be of a rather light 
structure, probably resembling a ‘Berlin Club’ as it is currently discussed in German 
government circles.
6 The task now is to design this structure in such a way as to allow for 
an orderly sovereign default including the participation of private creditors mentioned in the 
Council Conclusions. As mentioned above, this is likely to be the most difficult part of the 
new mechanism. Some sound first proposals in that direction can be found in Gianviti et al. 
(2010).  
Finally, some stylized facts stand out. First, it seems as if the inclusion of collective-action 
clauses (CACs) in sovereign-bond contracts is target-aimed.  Since banks are de facto 
under government control, gaining a creditor share of 75 percent does not appear to be out 
of reach in the case of the euro area. Second, a free-will commitment of large investors to 
stick to and continue to hold their investments in euro area sovereign bonds also in times 
of crisis is no incentive-compatible and full-fledged alternative. Seen on the whole, thus, 
the looming institutional follow-up to the EFSF framework does not differ too much from 
the EMF proposal.  
6 Similar to the informal Paris Club of public lenders at the international stage. 19
Recently, on November 12, Mrs. Merkel was quoted in the FT as follows: “Let me put it 
quite simply: in this regard there may be a contradiction between the interests of the 
financial world and the interests of the political world. … We cannot keep constantly 
explaining to our voters and our citizens why the taxpayer should bear the cost of certain 
risks and not those people who have earned a lot of money from taking those risks.” 
Whereas this appears to be substantially correct, this is the variant of issue which should 
preferably be clarified when there is no crisis. For twelve years now, especially German 
officials continued to deny that crises of this nature could ever happen. This means that the 
clarification of the “no bail-out” principle has now become the fundamental cause of the 
bond market crisis. Investors have hitherto acted based on the view of a shared euro area 
default risk which has clearly aggravated the debt crisis. Hence, the final recommendation 
by this paper is that rating agencies should be forced go for stand-alone ratings. 
6. Stand-alone ratings for countries – remedial action in case of 
market failure 
Last week, the EU Commission has published a consultation note addressing the further 
procedure with respect to rating agencies. The deadline for answers will be January 7, 
2011. Also the IMF has devoted a complete chapter of its recent Financial Stability Report 
to the rating agencies. The assessment of the PIGS states by rating agencies has up to now 
been severely misguided, insofar as a bail-out of these countries by the euro area was 
factored in. Any country rating without the inclusion of external assistance would be much 
more transparent. Such “stand-alone-ratings” are endowed with a couple of advantages: 
they are more precise, they allow for a responsive price setting and they provide quality 
criteria concerning the evaluation of government’s work. Furthermore, “stand-alone-
ratings” make it possible to derive more accurate assessments of the present value of the 
explicit and implicit assumptions of liability for the respective countries (Belke and Burghof, 
2010). 
The recent and still ongoing euro area debt crisis and its provisional (pseudo-) solution by 
this year’s  9/10 May rescue measures has revealed not only obvious elements of state 
failure – in particular the failure of the disciplinary devices of the EU – but also a significant 
dimension of market failure. If the markets had assessed the creditworthiness of certain 
countries more realistically, the apparent convergence of interest rates could have been 
avoided. This convergence had originally been the core objective of the creation of EMU. 
However, it was achieved by the - originally not at all intended - de facto abrogation of the 
‘no bail-out’ clause. This had devastating consequences, as the acute EU-debt crisis with its 
flickering sovereign bond spreads has impressively shown. 
Interest rates: here too low, there too high  
The currently growing divergence of government bond yields in the euro area clearly 
reveals that yields on German government bonds were too high and yields on PIGS bonds 
were too low over an extended period in the past. Market participants throughout relied on 
the political fiction that one could and would not let fall any euro area member country. 
Hence, potential savior countries such as Germany were forced to pay higher borrowing 
costs since markets anticipated that they would not only be destined to bail out the weaker 
countries but in the end also potentially had to save some of the savior countries. Countries 
like Portugal or Greece, in turn, benefited from too low real interest rates which led to 
excessive consumption, rapidly rising wages, falling competitiveness, higher trade balance 
deficits and, eventually, to a high private and public indebtedness. Notwithstanding Ireland 
and Spain where too low real interest rates fueled asset price bubbles. The consequences 
are well known by now.  
If interest rates had been allowed to diverge to a stronger extent, this would have provided 
incentives for euro area countries to optimize their budgetary policy risk-opportunity 
profile. However, this does not mean that all countries should have aimed at comparable 
debt ratios. Instead, more risky strategies such as going for debt financed domestic 
demand should have resulted in higher risk premia, though. Above all, the respective 20
countries would have been forced to find creditors who consider those strategies as 
reliable, independent from the existence of cross-national rescue mechanisms. What is 
more, the time frame of governments which pursue these kinds of strategies would have 
been shortened significantly. With an eye on the myopia which is typical of governments 
permanently striving for the retention of power, this would have been particularly valuable 
for the containment of an excessive debt policy (Belke and Burghof, 2010). 
Conceived vs. real solidarity  
Rating agencies play a crucial role in determining market assessments. Weaker EU 
countries received excellent ratings since they belong(ed) to an implicit community of 
solidarity. Although it had become apparent for a long time that, for instance, neither 
Portugal nor Greece was able to keep its domestic capital stock constant by concentrating 
on domestic savings, both countries were downgraded much too late by the agencies. With 
an eye on the fact that those economies slipped downwards only gradually and, finally, 
were on the brink of insolvency, such a rating pattern seems neither appropriate, i.e. true-
to-fact, nor responsible. The same is valid for Ireland and Spain. Their problems erupted 
after the burst of the housing bubble but had - as is by now well-known – also cumulated in 
a stepwise fashion.  
Basically, it appears to be legitimate to consider the construct of a conceived solidary group 
in the overall rating score, since investors, who are interested in the aggregated default 
risk, are addressed by credit ratings. In the case of the euro area, it proved to be a proper 
assumption to consider this solidary group. However, there are several reasons which 
support the claim that rating agencies should provide and also publish, in addition to the 
aggregated ratings, a stand-alone-rating which does not account for possible financial 
support of third parties in the assessment of the creditworthiness of countries (Belke and 
Burghof, 2010). 
Stand-alone-rating: few additional costs, much more precision 
The necessary information should be already available to the rating agencies. Thus, there 
would be little additional costs. In general, the assessment of the creditworthiness relies as 
a first step on the isolated evaluation of a single entity. This evaluation is modified not 
earlier than in a second step according to collateral and liability relations.  
Stand-alone-ratings may provide information revealing only limited relevance for investors, 
but with a crucially higher precision. The isolated analysis of the creditworthiness of a 
country based on available data on the budgetary stance, economic power and other 
fundamental conditions is a core competence of rating agencies. However, the question 
whether a rescue package is prepared and delivered by a third party, is beyond their reach 
and will be answered in the political sphere. Any forecast in that respect is subject to great 
uncertainty. Whether rating agencies really perform better in this business than others such 
as, for instance, investors appears doubtful at least. 
A central argument in favour of stand-alone-ratings is that they represent an important 
source of information for a more differentiated market perception and a correspondingly 
more responsive pricing. A failed government budget policy as a rule leads to higher 
interest rates and thus to a rapid restriction of the scope of action of the government. 
Hence, stand-alone ratings can help to foster the allocation function of the capital market 
(Belke and Burghof, 2010). 
Stand-alone-ratings also offer the voters important pieces of information about the quality 
of their government – a welcome corrective device in times of too frequent short-term 
orientation of economic policy before election dates. Finally, the comparison of the stand-
alone rating and the aggregated rating allows to asses and quantify the value of implicit 
and explicit assumptions of liability for the respective country. Obviously, keeping quiet 
about information related to stand-alone ratings of countries does not serve the common 
welfare, although, or even because this information is uncomfortable or even inconvenient 
for governments, and might cause them major problems. 21
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